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SEE Hardness Assurance as Risk Management
• Identify the Threat
• Space Radiation Environment
• SEE Susceptibilities of technologies
• Evaluate the Threat
• Risk=Probability(SEE)×Consequences(SEE)
• Bound SEE probability (rate) and consequences based on SEE mode characteristics, 
similarity data and SEE testing, etc.
• Mitigate the Threat
• Can design for tolerance of “likely” SEE modes even before test data available
• Mitigation may reduce either probability of SEE or its consequences
• SEE probability → selecting benign environment, application modification, or part substitution 
• SEE consequences → usually involves redundancy, part substitution or limiting performance
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Outline
• Introduction
• Preliminary Concepts
• Types of SEE
• Classical SEE Hardness Assurance
• Identify the Threat
• Requirements, Environment, Technology Assessment and SEE Vulnerability
• Evaluate the Threat
• Proxy data, SEE test data and analysis
• Mitigate the Threat
• SEE Hardening Strategies
• New SEE Challenges and Opportunities
• Challenges of COTS—Profusion, Complexity and Testability
• Challenges of New Platforms—Budget, Error/Failure Tolerance and Performance
• Questioning Assumptions—even fundamental ones
• Conclusions
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SEE Fundamentals: Cross Section and LET
• Ion energy loss rate (LET) vs. ion energy
• Most energy loss due to ionization
• SEE susceptibility increases w/ Q in SV
• SEE cross section, σ=# SEE/Fluence (#particles/cm2)
• σ increases w/ Q
• If SV small and thin, LET~constant in SV, can replace 
σ vs. Q with σ vs. LET
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SEE Radiation Environments
• Space radiation environment has 2 ion sources/types
• Galactic Cosmic Rays (GCR) have Atomic # 1≤ Z ≤ 92 and 
energies ~100s of MeV/nucleon (shielding ineffective)
• Solar Particle Events have 1≤ Z ≤ 26 (mostly) and energies 
up to ~10s of MeV/nucleon (shielding can be effective)
• Solar protons/electrons trapped by planetary magnetic fields to 
form radiation belts
• Terrestrial radiation environment produced by 
interactions between GCR and SPE.
• Measurable GCR flux persists into the upper 
stratosphere
• In troposphere and at Earth’s surface, mainly 
neutrons and muons (a few/cm2/s)
• Flux worse near poles  and at high altitude.
• Neutrons cause SEE only by indirect ionization
• Muons could cause SEE by indirect ionization, but low 
mass equates to low momentum transfer.
• Not an issue yet at nominal supply voltages.
Van Karman LineAdapted form K. Endo, Nikkei Science, Japan
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Single-Event Effects
• SEE can occur any time w/  same probability 
• Follow Poisson statistics
• , µ=expected #
• Can dominate radiation risk for short-
duration missions or benign radiation 
environments where TID failure risk minimal
• SEE consequences/mode  depend on device 
technology and can be
• Destructive (e.g. Single-Event Latchup—SEL)
• Nondestructive and temporary (e.g. SET)
• Nondestructive and recoverable (e.g. SEU)
• Nondestructive, recoverable but disruptive 
(e.g. Single-Event Functional Interrupt--SEFI)
• Affect only a single part/die 
• Possible exceptions: overvoltage, bus 
contention, stacked parts
• Single-Event Effect (SEE)—a change in state, 
stored data, output or functionality cased by 
passage of a single ionizing particle through 
a sensitive volume (SV) in the device.
• Ionizing particle may be a primary heavy ion, 
secondary ion resulting from a scattering event, a 
primary proton (deep submicron CMOS)—or, in 
principle, a muon or even an electron
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Single-Event Latchup (SEL) in CMOS 
Substrate involvement →
SV depth >>10 µm;
“Similarity” value limited for SEL because SCR is parasitic 
Short-range ions likely 
underestimate SEL risk.
SEL: destructive SEE parasitic Silicon Controlled Rectifier (SCR =pnpn structure)
Worst case: High T, V; 
and ion range ~ 10s of µm
Cryogenic SEL occurs
due to carrier avalanching
SEL Consequences
1) Failure of Single die; 
2) Latent damage 
3) Loss of Functionality.
Mitigation
1) Cold Sparing
2) Replace susceptible parts 
3) Current limit/Power cycle
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Single-Event Gate Rupture (SEGR) in Power MOSFETs
Adapted from M. Allenspach, 
IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci. 41, pp. 
2160-2166.
SEGR: inherently destructive failure of gate dielectric for MOSFET in OFF state
WC Conditions for SEGR
1) MOSFET OFF (nonconducting)
2) Higher |VDS| and  |VGS|.
3) Ions incident normal to gate
4) Ions having higher Z
5) Energy to reach below epi layer
Two-step process:
1) Ion strike weakens gate oxide, 
2) Holes under gate rupture oxide
Latent damage to gate possible
New technologies can introduce new vulnerabilities
Rate estimation impractical 
SEGR test yields safe VDS/VGS
SEGR Mitigation
1) Derate to safe VDS, VGS
2) Replace susceptible part
3) Redundancy
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Single-Event Burnout (SEB)
SEB: High-current parasitic BJT turned on in power MOSFET, JFET or BJT.
Thermal latent damage possible.
σ vs. LET measurable with 
current limiting of SEB.SEB dominates for COTS MOSFETs
New technologies introduce new failure modes .
Complicated mechanism makes 
rate estimation impractical. 
Testing gives VDS/VGS safe curve.
WC Conditions for SEB
1) Part OFF (nonconducting)
2) Higher |VDS| and  |VGS|.
3) Ions incident normal to gate
4) Ions having higher Z
5) Range to reach below epi layer
SEB Mitigation
1) Derate to safe VDS, VGS
2) Replace susceptible part
3) Redundancy
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Nondestructive SEE
• Single-Event Transient (SET)—temporary disturbance of 
output of an analog or digital integrated circuit, gate, etc.
• Transient characterized amplitude and duration, as above
• Effect of transient depends on downstream circuitry
• May be latched in  downstream bistable elements
• Could overstress sensitive devices downstream
• Single-Event Upset (SEU)—bit flip of a bistable memory 
cell, gate or register
• Multi-Cell and Multi-Bit Upset (MCU/MBU)—>1 bit 
upset by same ion is an MCU; MBU if bits in same word 
• Single-Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI)—Interruption 
of normal device function, e.g. by upset in control logic
• Stuck Bits—permanent loss of programmability of 
single bit 
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Identifying SEE Threats: The Environment
• Galactic Cosmic Rays
• Extremely high energies, so shielding 
has little effect, low flux
• Cause SEE in both hardened and 
unhardened devices’
• Solar Particle Event Protons
• Variable flux; Shielding has some effect
• Main concern is for soft devices
• Solar Heavy Ions
• Variable flux; shielding effective
• Concern for both soft/hard devices
• Trapped Protons
• Flux continual within belts, but worst 
for altitude >1000 km (0° inclination)
• Shielding has some effect
• Mainly a concern for soft devices
Trapped Protons  
Fairly Benign
Severe
Trapped 
Protons
GCR, SPE 
Slightly 
Attenuated
GCR, SPE somewhat 
Attenuated
Full GCR, SPE
Interplanetary
Full GCR and SPE
Polar
Full GCR and SPE
Over poles
Severe trapped 
Protons in belts
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Identifying SEE Threats: Device Technologies
• Technology determines potential susceptibility
• Similar technologies often exhibit similar susceptibilities
• GaNFETs, SiCFETs susceptible to SEGR; TrenchFETs usually susceptible to SEB
• New Technologies may exhibit new failure modes
• SiC exhibits degradation (similar to Schottky diodes) as well as SEB and SEGR
• Commercial parts may exhibit different failure modes than rad hard counterparts
• Commercial MOSFETs tend to fail via SEB, while rad hard MOSFETs fail due to SEGR
• Some failure modes exhibit trends with technology node, while some do not
• Trends almost always have exceptions.
Common
High
Moderate
Not seen but 
possible
SEL SEGR SEB SEDR Stuck Bit SEU/MCU SET SEFI
CMOS MOSFET
POWER 
MOSFET
One-time 
Prog. FPGA SRAM
Digital/bistable 
cells
bipolar 
technology
Complex 
Microcircuits
Bipolar? FLASH
Power JFET 
or BJT
Bipolar 
Microcircuits DRAM
Analog 
microcircuit ADCs
Schottky 
Diode FLASH
Digital 
microcircuit PWMs
Deep submicron 
CMOS more MCU 
susceptible
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Evaluating SEE Threats: Sources of Data
• To bound SEE risk, need data constraining both SEE 
rates and SEE consequences.
• SEE testing destructive—cannot test flight parts
• SEE data on sample from flight or other lot sufficiently 
representative
• DSEE may vary more part-to-part and lot-to-lot 
• Similarity data requires statistical model that converts 
data for other parts into bound on class of parts to 
which flight parts belong.
• Other data possibly valuable for constraining SEE risk
• Physics (e.g. Process info and SEL susceptibility)
• Heavy-ion data as proxy for proton SEE 
• Proton data as proxy for heavy-ion SEE
• Technology, etc.
• Need to have statistical/physical model to relate to 
flight-part SEE performance.
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Proxy Example: SET Risk From Similarity Data
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Proxy Example: Bounding Heavy-Ion SEE Risk w/ Protons
• Protons cause SEE by indirect ionization—recoil ion responsible for SEE
• Low space ion fluxes allow bounding ion fluence w/ LET <10 MeVcm2/mg
• Testing possible without extensive modification of parts
• Caveats:
• Only ~1/289000 protons generated recoil ion—coverage poor
• For DSEE and other SEE w/ deep SV, charge limited by ion range, not LET
Ion Fluence: 2-yr LEO & GEO vs1010 protons/cm2 Recoil ions due to 1010 protons/cm2
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SEE Testing: Goals Differ for Different SEE modes
• Most SEE tests seek to map device susceptibility (measured by 
SEE cross section σ) vs. LET
• σ vs. LET then combined with radiation model for mission 
environment to calculate mission specific rate
• For SEB/SEGR, mechanism is too complicated 
to allow for rigorous rate estimation
• Need to avoid risk by mapping out application 
voltages where part susceptible
• Result is Safe Operating Area
Ion flux vs. energy for 
Z=1-92 from CREME96 
SEE σ vs. LET for 
heavy ions
16
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Goals of SEE Testing: Rate Estimation
• Buchner’s Rule-Only 2 SEE rates matter: zero and nonzero
• Can be accomplished with a single heavy-ion test run to high 
fluence (>107 ions/cm2) and high LET
• Does not allow comparison beyond go/no-go
• Rectangular Parallelepiped (RPP) Model requires ≥4 
parameters related to Weibull fit to σ vs. LET
• LET0—onset LET
• σsat—saturated cross section for Weibull fit
• w and s—Weibull width and shape parameters
• Possible to predict rate to factor of 2x
• Other parameters, x, y, z, f=funnel
• Assumes 
• simple slab SV geometry
• LET constant along chord length
• Figure of Merit, FOM=C(Env)*σsat/(LET0.25)2
• C(Env) depends on radiation environment
• Requires runs at a few LET values (>3)
• Rates are ~order of magnitude, allowing comparison
• Can be used for protons or heavy ions 
• Monte Carlo Rate Estimation (e.g. CRÈME-MC)
• Determines rate by propagating realistic ions through 
realistic model of device structures
• Better device models yield better results
• Usually used when device structure is complicated (e.g. 
multiple sensitive volumes) or when deviations from 
constant ion LET important
17
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Carrying out the SEE test
• SEE Testing Standards
• JESD-57: Test Procedures for the Measurement of Single-Event Effects in Semiconductor Devices from Heavy Ion 
Irradiation
• Revision just completed
• ASTM-F1192: Standard Guide for the Measurement of Single Event Phenomena (SEP) Induced by Heavy Ion 
Irradiation of Semiconductor Devices
• Revised in 2011
• MIL-STD-750, Test Method 1080 Single Event Burnout and Single Event Gate Rupture
• Revised 2012
• ESCC 25100, Single Event Effects Test Method and Guidelines from European Space Components Coordination 
(ESCC) 
• Revised 2014
• Testing usually carried out for worst-case/bounding application conditions
• Examples: SEL @ high temperature and voltage; SEGR: Ions at normal incidence, Z of ion > 28, VDS/VGS bounding
• Ensures detection of susceptibility if present in device 
• Observation: There is no single SEE test methodology
• For each SEE test mode—method is optimized to ensure susceptibility detected if present in part
• Ion characteristics, application conditions usually include worst-case for SEE mode.
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Tailor mission 
requirements and 
environment to 
foster mission 
success. Select parts for 
SEE hardening or 
by technology for 
immunity to SEE 
of concern.
Design system for 
tolerance to SEE 
modes likely to occur. 
Carry Out SEE 
testing appropriate 
for mission and 
part technologies.
Implement specific  
strategies for SEE 
modes as needed 
and appropriate
Validate 
methodology with 
mission performance 
data; improve if 
needed 
Mitigation Can Happen at All Phases of Mission
Pre-A
Concept Studies
Phase A
Concept + Technology
Development
Phase B
Preliminary Design
+Technology. Complete.
Phase C
Final Design 
+Fabrication
Phase D
System Assembly
+I&T +Launch + Checkout.
Phase E
Operations
Phase F
Closeout
NASA Mission Phases
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Mitigating SEE Risk
Strategy Comments
Part Substitution Need specific data; performance 
hit?
Select Application 
Conditions to 
Minimize Rate
Need specific data; performance 
hit?
Opportunistic
Strategies
e.g. ∆Vin effect onLM139 SETs; bit 
interleaving; need specific test data
Limit performance 
to Requirements
e.g. RC filtering of SETs, limit 
frequency to reduce SETs
Strategy Comments
Part Substitution Need specific data; performance hit?
Select Application  
to minimize 
Consequences
Need specific data; performance hit?
Redundancy e.g. EDAC, Voting, cold sparing. Can 
decrease reliability if done poorly.
Speed detection 
and recovery
e.g. Watchdog timers; error checking 
automated recovery
Decrease SEE Risk
Decrease SEE Rate/Probability Decrease SEE Consequences
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Redundancy—Must Pay In The Currency of The Realm
Data Accuracy
p1
p2p3
d4
d3
d2 d1
EDAC
Voting 
t
t+∆t
t+2∆t
Temporal
Voting 
Availability
V
P R1 R2
Survivability
Hamming(7,4) 
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After Benedetto et al.,
Radiation Effects Data Workshop 1999,
12-16 July 1999, pp. 87-91.
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Multi-Tiered Mitigation
• Real systems often use multi-tiered SEE mitigation
• Example at right
1. EDAC schemes can correct various #s of bits  (e.g. Hamming code) 
or “nibbles” (e.g. Reed-Solomon 4 consecutive bits in a word)
2. EDAC at right corrects j bits/nibble
3. Memory architecture interleaves data across memory modules so j 
or fewer nibbles stored on each device
4. Processors P1, P2, P3 vote output (propagating EDAC through entire 
processor algorithm usually too inefficient)
5. PR is redundant processor—if unbiased, it is swapped in to replace 
failed (e.g. SEL) P1, P2 or P3; if biased, it replaces P1, P2 or P3 if 
unavailable (e.g. SEFI) at time of voting
6. Memory provides data to P1, P2 and P3 (and PR if it is used to 
ensure availability)
7. Capacitative filtering to mitigate transients (not shown)…
• Note that efficacy of all redundancy requires errors to be 
independent AND P(error/failure) <<1
P1 P2 P3
Voting
PR
Redundant EDAC bits mitigate corrupted
data bits; bits interleaved to avoid MBU
Cold-spare processor mitigates
functional failure of P1, P2 or P3
Redundant “hot” spares mitigate loss 
of processor functionality; bit-by-bit 
voting mitigates data corruption. 22
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Why Harden SmallSats?
• Most SmallSats to date flown by educational institutions
• Short turn-around time and short duration well suited to students
• If mission fails, failure is a harsh but effective teacher
• Consequences of failure usually not severe
• Not a replacement for conventional missions
• Make possible new types of missions and new players
• SmallSats could also be useful for science applications
• Swarm missions well suited to geoscience, planetary exploration, etc.
• Lower cost would allow “riskier” high-performance technologies
• Single-instrument mission conceivable with a SmallSats
• Improved reliability and longer mission duration desirable
• For important science data, stakes maybe higher
• Longer satellite life means better time series data (fewer splices)
• Cheaper launch costs mean more money for instruments
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SEE Hardness Assurance for SmallSats: Challenges
SmallSats SEE HA Challenges
• Schedule critical for secondary payloads—
• miss the date and stay on the ground
• Delivery times for space/military parts may be longer 
than the mission schedule
• Budgets limited—secondary payload makes little 
sense if cost >>cost of launch as primary payload
• Size, Weight and Power limited
• Meeting performance likely requires parts COTS
• Often little if any similarity or other data on COTS
• Higher risk tolerance ≠ lower qualification budget
• SEE test costs often dominated by part preparation 
and test equipment development
• Testing less (fewer beam hours) may not save much
COTS SEE physics 
of failure not well 
understood
Not much
COTS similarity
data 
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SEE Test Costs and Potential Savings
• Summary of 2006 Costs
• Parts and Part Preparation~7%
• Test development~4%
• Tester development~40%
• Manpower (test execution)~15%
• Beam time~15%
• Data analysis and Report~19%
• >50% of test cost is in development.  Where are savings?
• Less testing saves beam & manpower time, but increases risk
• Protons save part prep and beam costs, but increase risk
• Ultra-high energy heavy ions save prep costs , but $$$$
• Laser saves beam costs, but may increase part prep costs
• Very hard to reduce costs for conventional SEE testing
• Development costs, analysis also dominated by manpower
• SmallSats COTS reliance also limits other data sources
• Limited SEE data or physics of failure knowledge
• Conventional SEE Hardness Assurance likely beyond means 
of most low-budget programs.
25
• SEE test costs  front loaded
• Limited opportunities for savings, especially if rate 
estimation needed.
SEE test costs adapted from K. LaBel, 2006
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SEE Hardness Assurance Options for SmallSats Teams
• Buy-it-and-Fly it
• Viable if you can determine why missions fail and correct for next mission
• Board-level testing with protons or ultra-high energy heavy ions
• “Test everything at once” 
• Can be done with protons or ultra-high energy heavy ions
• Rely on the kindness of strangers (partner w/ conventional satellite builder)
• Left-over rad hard parts may be available
• Larger group may provide more test and analysis capabilities
• SmallSats may offer a test platform for new technologies of interest
• Risk-informed testing
• Develop metric measuring consequences of possible error/failure modes
• Use metric to prioritize testing decisions
• Strategies can be combined
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Buy-It-And-Fly-It
• COTS solutions exist for almost any satellite function 
• High performance and power achieved through use 
of state-of-the-art COTS parts
• Usually no radiation data available
• Problem: If commercial system in a critical application, 
may never know what failed
• Same flawed part could be used on nest satellite, or good 
parts of design could be scrapped to avoid same failure
• Unable to provide feedback to vendor for improvement 
of his product
• Diverse redundancy for critical systems could increase 
probability of mission success, but penalizes for SWAP 
and complexity
• If the systems are commercial, how do you know the 
insides don’t contain common-mode failures?
Gomspace FPGA-Based Software Defined Radio
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Board-Level Proton Testing
• Advantages
• Board-level testing allows quick System SEE 
Assessment
• No part preparation needed due to long proton range 
• Advanced test equipment not usually needed as 
diagnostic information limited to observed errors and 
functionality of system
• Disadvantages
• Will mask some SEE that could affect operations
• Not possible to test WC for every part type
• Protons may not reveal destructive SEE modes
• Difficult to interpret results 
• If part-to-part variability significant for any 
parts in system, test unit performance may 
differ from flight performance• In part-level proton testing, characteristics of ion that caused SEE unknown
• In board-level SEE testing, even the distribution of ion 
LETs responsible for SEE results unknown
• May be better able to decrypt results if device 
technologies (e.g. epi thickness) known
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Board-Level Testing Also Possible with Ultra-High Energy Ions
• Heavy-ion board-level testing has similar advantages and 
disadvantages to proton board-level testing, except:
• Advantages
• Much more likely to reveal destructive SEE
• Ion characteristics that cause a given SEE are known, allowing 
some understanding of mechanisms
• Disadvantages with available ultra-high energy ion beams
• Insufficient energy/range to test multiple boards
• Insufficient energy/range to penetrate overburden on some parts
• Beam time costly (~$5000/hr.)
• Selection of ions limited and retuning needed (~8 hr.) for change
• For ultra-high energy ion beams w/ limited ions,  σ vs. LET 
curve  constructed using variable-depth Bragg peak method
• Ion beam energy degraded until cross section for SEE mode is 
saturated—if device overburden known, can calculate LET
• If device overburden unknown, can further degrade ion beam 
until  ion ranges out
• Decrease degradation to get additional LET points 
• Not well suited for board-level testing
• Different devices on board may have different 
overburden
• Each device may see different LET
• Saturation for a part may mean range-out for others
• Detailed DPA and understanding of overburden for 
all parts needed to understand results
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Partnering
• Advantages of partnering with high-reliability satellite manufacturers
• Access to “left-over” space-grade parts
• Access to lab and design facilities and expertise
• Disadvantages of partnering
• Leftovers means you may not have access to everything on the menu
• Unless rad hard parts are on the shelf, waiting on deliveries poses schedule risk
• Testing by high-rel manufacturers may not be optimized
• Advantages for high-rel manufacturers
• SmallSats can provide flight experience for technologies of mutual interest
• More interesting if SmallSats can fly in a more severe environment
• Flying more devices (e.g. in triplicate voting scheme) adds more confidence.
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Risk Informed Hardness Assurance
• What does failure cost?
• Each mission goal can be expressed as % of mission 
cost based on value to the mission
• Sum of these costs for goals not met due to 
subsystem failure is cost of that failure
• Can failure exceed mission cost?
• If failure is so complete that failure cause cannot be 
determined, subsequent failures due to same cause 
could contribute to total failure cost
• Risk metric
• Normally Risk = Cost x Probability, but
• Lacking test data, probability of failure unknown
• Cost by itself can serve to prioritize test and 
mitigation efforts 
• Assumptions about failure probability based on 
technology (e.g. CMOS known to be SEL susceptible)
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Some Examples
• Cibola Flight Experiment (CFE) designed to gather and 
process data for lightning and ionospheric studies
• Main goal: assess RF antenna and related technology
• Reconfigurable Computer was one of the first uses of 
reconfigurable FPGAs (Xilinx XQVR1000)
• Partnership w/ Los Alamos National Laboratory afforded 
significant advantages for radiation testing/hardening
• FPGAs triplicate voted, has watchdogs + error checking + diverse 
redundancy
• Has already exceeded mission life goal by >2x
• Peregrine Lunar Lander from Astrobotic Technologies
• 345 kg (dry weight) lander designed to deliver payloads to lunar 
surface for $1.2 Million/kg.
• Driven to make aggressive use of COTS due to schedule, cost, SWAP 
and performance
• Redundancy not an optimal hardening strategy as it directly impacts 
payload that can be delivered
• Receiving guidance from NASA’s Lunar Cargo Transportation and 
Landing by Soft Touchdown (Lunar CATALYST) program
• Radiation approach still a work in progress
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Summary: SEE Hardness Assurance for SmallSats
• SmallSats pose unique challenges
• Cost and Schedule force use of COTS, for which we have little radiation data
• SEE hardness assurance methods not well suited to capitalize on risk tolerance
• SmallSats also pose unique potential
• Well suited to collecting data for geoscience and planetary exploration
• Spirit and Opportunity were consistent with SmallSats philosophy
• Provide opportunity for risk-tolerant technology insertion
• Swarm missions provide new approaches to reliability and survivability
• SmallSats also provide opportunities for radiation hardness assurance
• Can we develop methodologies that capitalize on risk tolerance?
• Can these methods be applied to conventional satellite platforms?
• What additional risks would we run?
• What assumptions can we make to reduce costs across the board?
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Rule of Thumb Oops
SETs are recoverable SET >1.8 V may damage RTAX-S FPGAs (Actel RTAX-S datasheet) 
RF devices are SET immune SOTA now CMOS responds to ps transients 
MOSFETs SEB/SEGR immune if VDS<30% of rated
VDS
IRF640 commercial MOSFET fails to Ni w/ 22% of rated VDS 
(O’Bryan, REDW 2003)
Bipolar ICs immune to destructive SEE Failure in AD9048 (Koga et al., TNS 1994), AMP01 (O’Bryan et 
al. , REDW 1999), Others (Lum et al. , TNS 2000)
CMOS devices are ELDRS immune Dose rate effects in CMOS (Witczak et al. TNS 2005)
CMOS devices immune to DD Bulk damage in SDRAM cells (Shindou et al., TNS 2003, David et 
al., TNS 2006)
Indirect ionization negligible if LETth>15 SEU seen in hardened SRAM due to p +W scattering (Warren et 
al., TNS 2005)
If SEL leaves part functional, it’s nondestructive Latent damage due to SEL, (H. Becker et al. , TNS 2005)
Others? Stay tuned!
A catalogue of unpleasant surprises originally presented in 2007 short course.  So what’s new?
A Visit From The Ghost of Short Courses Past
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Surprises since 2007
• Surprises found in testing about every 2 years or so
• If we rely too much on assumptions to save cost and schedule, we will discover them on orbit instead
Rule of Thumb Oops!
SEL gets better with decreasing temperature SEL observed in Read-out IC at cryogenic temperatures <40 K 
(C. Marshall et al., TNS 2010)
SEE are not important for diodes Schottky diodes observed to fail catastrophically due to 
previously unknown SEE mechanism. 
(R. Gigliuto and M. Casey, NEPP ETW 2012)
If part has no W plugs, no need to worry about proton 
destructive SEE if onset LET >20 MeVcm2/mg.
p+Au fission in packages w/ Au plated lids produces ions w/ 
LET  ~40 Mev•cm2/mg  (T. Turflinger et al., TNS 2015)
No need to worry about proton-induced fission if 
package has no high-Z materials 
σ for p + Pd (Z=46) fission nearly as high as  for p + Au (Z=79). 
Fission seen even for p + Ni (T. Turflinger et al., TNS 2016)
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And Last But Not Least: We Don’t Have to Worry About 
Lot-to-Lot Variation for SEE… Do We?
• ESA: 3 Lots of SRAMs 
procured in same buy
• DC922 tested and found 
to have low SEL rate
• DC328 and DC220 SEL 
rates much higher
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Conclusions I
• SEE hardness assurance is a risk management tool
• Identify the threat (based on device technologies and mission environment)
• Evaluate the threat (based on testing device and analyzing other data)
• Mitigate the threat (using redundancy, part substitution, circuit redesign, etc.)
• SEE mechanisms and space radiation environments mostly understood
• Facilitates identification of threats
• Allows tests to be designed for worst-case conditions to detect susceptibilities
• Use of proxy data to bound SEE rates remains challenging
• Biggest Challenge: Not enough data!
• Similarity data can constrain some SEE behavior (e.g. SET) but not others (e.g. SEL)
• Proton data give an idea of low LET susceptibility for nondestructive SEE
• Physics and engineering judgment can also help (e.g. SEL mainly a risk in CMOS)
• Mitigation strategies target probability, consequences or both
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Conclusions II
• Extending SEE hardness assurance to SmallSats, etc. highly desirable
• Longer missions mean better data sets
• Small, inexpensive satellite swarms well suited to some missions
• SEE for small, inexpensive satellites poses significant challenges
• Cost, schedule and SWAP all but necessitate wide use of COTS
• Current HA methodology not well suited to consider risk tolerance to reduce costs 
• Many interesting strategies, but their effective use is still a work in progress.
• Developing SEE HA for SmallSats may also improve it for larger platforms
• Risk tolerant SEE HA would be useful for any mission
• SmallSats could provide platform for assessing new technologies
• SmallSats are not a replacement for conventional platforms
• Not enough testing to detect new radiation threats
• In a healthy space program SmallSats and conventional satellites will supplement rather than compete
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